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Abstract: Humanity has experienced three major periods of war – 500Bc the Greek wars, 1600AD the Thirty Years War and 
1900AD the Two World Wars. These were the most significant times of war in human history, as far as is known to Western 
science. IR scientists do not know much about other regions in the world. All of these major periods of war brought forth the 
classics in the field of IR (International Relations) and the main political inventions, for example Hobbes with the principle of 
sovereignty, or Kant with the ideas for global democratic organisation, or the invention of the discipline of IR and the UN. All 
of these periods of war have been preceded by sudden massive population growth. This article will sketch the evolution of war 
and politics over the longue duree. For this purpose, the history of war and the history of political thought will be discussed. As 
causes for the major wars, sudden massive population growth is identified. How the latter causes war is theorised in the paper, 
as far as possible. Population is still massively growing in the times of the 21
st
 century, and should be kept in reasonable limits. 
Arguments for protection of childlessness will be presented at the end of this article. 
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1. Introduction 
We have experienced in the known history of ‘Western 
civilization’ three major periods of war: 500BC the Greek 
wars [1], 1600AD the 30 Years War and following troubles, 
1900AD two global wars, the Two World Wars. While 
Western science doesn’t know enough about wars in the 
missing periods or other regions – it is certain that crusades 
occurred, that Central America and Asia experienced wars in 
the meantime, but not sufficient about these occurrences is 
known to Western International Relations scholars and must 
therefore here be excluded – these three periods of war 
produced all the to us currently available and popular 
literature on politics and related matters that Western science 
uses: The Greek philosophers that scientists refer to wrote in 
the first period of war, IR’s ‘classics’ – Hobbes, Locke, Kant 
etc. – wrote in the second period or shortly after, and the 
discipline of International Relations (IR) itself was 
established within the third period of war around 1919.  
While this in itself is a novel insight, an additional factor 
that explains the potential causes leading to these major 
periods of war that have not yet been sufficiently discussed in 
the literature on war causation will be presented here: Sudden 
massive population growth. As the data in the appendix 
illustrate, all three major periods of war have been preceded 
by unprecedented massive population growth. This factor in 
itself is not completely unknown in the IR literature: World 
System [2] theorists talked about lateral pressures to mean 
the same in their critique on capitalism and hegemony [3], 
but they did not look back as far in history, usually stopping 
around 1400 and did not necessarily draw a connection to 
war. Interestingly, however, taking this factor seriously and 
looking at the – admittedly very sparse – available historical 
data shows us that all three major periods of war have been 
preceded by sudden massive population growth. The same – 
as far as it is possible to tell – happened in China where the 
main period of war was in the 18th century [4]. 
Principally, this explanation is not illogical. Rapid massive 
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population growth must put strain on both political and 
economic systems, which might cause them to collapse or 
dysfunction, leading to massive poverty, inequality and 
governance failures, all known causes of violence that 
scientists also observe in many developing regions of the 
world today or in the recent past. For example, a similar 
mechanism could be speculatively put on the cause of the 
Arab Spring: A ‘youth bulge’ developed after massive 
population growth in the 1990ies, met with unemployment in 
the 2000s, and this created the favourable conditions for 
terrorism and rebellions.  
Little is known in the literature that can guide us further 
here. The reasons for these periods of sudden massive 
population growth can only be speculated about, and might 
have to do with civilizational progress, for example due to 
inventions, which might have brought about an easier life for 
many, economic progress, and hence population growth. But 
this must remain speculation, as the information is not 
available. What scientists can know is that before all major 
periods of war, important armaments inventions – the 
crossbow around 400BC, the rifle around 1600AD, the tank 
around 1900AD – were made, which indicates that probably 
other inventions also flourished around these times, 
supporting the above interpretation.  
This article will propose a model of political evolution first 
– all the major IR writings throughout history have produced 
important political changes and inventions which attempted 
to secure the peace for some time to come, and will then 
present the explanation, including all what scientists have of 
evidence in the appendix, for the model of major war 
causation. The main part will also include a treatise on 
feminism with the defense of the decision to abstain from 
procreation, an interest that concerned at least some women 
throughout history and is met with not sufficient rights and 
protection in many places around the world.  
2. The Model: Sudden Massive 
Population Growth, Inequality, Major 
War, and World State Ideas 
All major ideas for new political inventions (the city state, 
the Roman Empire, the sovereign state, the UN system) have 
been made in the three major periods of war in human history 
(the Greek wars, the Renaissance period/ 30 Years war, the 
Two World Wars). All of these times of major upheaval in the 
whole of human history brought forth the known world state 
ideas that scientists teach (sovereignty, UN, EU etc.). Of 
course, also most writing about war was produced in these 
times (Thucydides, Hobbes, whatnot). Humanity could still 
be in one of those periods (the third period so far). These 
periods have been causally connected to sudden massive 
global or at least regional (in the Greek period) population 
increases (there is some data available on population growth 
that goes that far back, but not much). So, in all of these 
periods, probably technological inventions brought about an 
easier life, this resulted in sudden massive population growth, 
and then inequalities and poverty and struggles for equality 
(power, status etc.) resulted in the known causes of war. For 
example, industrialization could be one such 'technological' 
change which brought about the Two World Wars, with first 
increases in life chances for some, population growth, and 
many groups, classes and whatnot left out. That's the basic 
model. Now, the predictions go that the world is still in a 
period where dramatic population growth for until 2090 is 
predicted (some say up to a total of 14 billion by 2090, others 
are a bit less dramatic, but overall the picture is not very 
reassuring). This could on the one hand mean opportunities. 
For example, it is possible that economic development in 
Africa is dependent on population growth, as one needs 
manpower for a functioning economy (compare London, 
Japan and New York vs Russia, for example, to see that). On 
the other hand, if it is not well managed and supported, it 
might mean a risk for continued severe conflicts, as has just 
happened in Syria, with mass migrations etc. Hence, looking 
at history, humanity might need to learn that to respond to 
this a larger, stronger and much more efficient international 
or global governance system that can help distribute 
resources to where they are needed is required.  
3. History of War in Graphs 
Interpretation: The Greek wars are shown in the first red 
circle around 500BC. Interestingly, and still without any 
explanation, is the apparently relative lack of war around 100 
to 200AD (second red circle).  
Explanation: As far as the data are known, relatively few 
wars of relatively minor importance occurred after 0AD and 
before the 30 Years War in 1618. Exceptions are, for 
example, the crusades. But all available data indicate that 
wars at least in Europe in this period were still of less 
significance than after 1600AD. The reason for this is 
unknown. Along with this, few political treatises were 
produced in this period, which was more marked by the 
dominance of religion in international affairs.  
Table 1. Own production. Major periods of war and political theory classics. 
Year Event Writers 
500BC Greek wars (Greece against Sparta etc.), see figure 1 above.  Thucydides (500BC), Plato (500BC), Aristotle (400BC) 
1600AD 
30 Years War and following troubles (1618-1648, early 17th 
century), following troubles see figure 2 above. 
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke (early 17th century) 
Immanuel Kant and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (early 18th century)  
1900AD World War I and World War II, see figure 2 above.  
Establishment of the discipline of International Relations in 1919 with all 
the following publications.  
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Figure 1. Civilizations, Empires and Wars, 1500 BC to AD 500. Source: William Edward (1992): Civilizations, Empires and Wars. A Quantitative History. 
Jefferson: McFarland & Co, 55. 
 
Figure 2. Source: Max Roser: War and Peace. Online: https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace. Republished with kind permission. 
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Explanation: All the main writings on politics and 
international relations that IR scientists commonly refer to 
today have been produced in or after the known three major 
periods of war. IR scientists do know less about wars and 
political writings in and from other regions of the world, such 
as in particular the Middle East and Asia, where history 
might have produced different results. Other regions of the 
world might in the past not have had the level of 
development to produce major political writings, even if wars 
might have occurred, such as for example in South and 
Central America.  
4. World State Ideas 
That ideas have been, are and will be at the root of societal 
and hence political evolution has been maintained especially 
by Constructivists:  
“Epistemologically and methodologically, whereas realism 
is mostly a materialism approach and can thus somewhat 
afford to ignore the real processes of ideational change and 
the transformational power of ideas in human society, 
constructivism, as an ideationalism approach, cannot afford 
to ignore the real processes of ideational change while 
preaching the transformational power of ideas. In order to 
have much a say on ideational change at all, constructivism 
needs to look at real processes of ideational change at the 
individual, state-level, and inter-state level” [5] 
Tang maintains that “consistent with the social 
evolutionary approach toward institutional change, this 
process of institutionalizing regional peace [here referring to 
global institutionalisation] has often been led by power and 
ideas that promote peace, rather than either ideas or brutal 
power alone.” [6]. 
Looking at the past, ideas had a massive transformative 
power on world politics: All the major writings on war, as 
well as the writings on political solutions have been made in 
the above stated three periods of major warfare. There is 
nothing – or not much – from other periods, such as the early 
years after Christ, for example. There was maybe a lot of 
stability then, with existing political institutions working 
fairly well, no major war and no massive changes, which 
could account for this fact.  
4.1. Early Thoughts 
The period of the Greek wars, if or if not really one of the 
first major periods of war, seems to have inspired much 
political thought and invention, from the first forms of 
democracy, to the city state, to the formation of the first 
leagues, to – arguably - the Roman empire etc.  
However, as Malchow maintains, apart from Thucydides, 
whom Malchow calls ‘the father of IR’, most contemporaries 
did not concern themselves with interstate affairs: “Ancient 
Greek literature has little to say about the state system and 
interstate relations, and can offer little direct contribution to 
the construction of IR theory” [7]. However, Thucydides, 
writing around 500BC, the time of the Persian Wars (500-
448BC), established as the first author a history of war, an 
analysis of causes of war, principles of balance of power, 
hegemony, and Realpolitik, and hence, arguably, the school 
of ‘Realism’.  
Zarnett quotes Thucydides:  
“Indeed this [war] was the greatest movement yet known 
in history, not only of Hellenes, but of a large part of the 
barbarian world-I had almost said of mankind. For though the 
events of remote antiquity, and even those that more 
immediately precede the war, could not from lapse of time be 
clearly ascertained, yet the evidences which an inquiry 
carried as far back as was practicable lead me to trust, all 
point to the conclusion that there was nothing on a greater 
scale, either in war or in other matters.” [8] 
If this is taken at face value, it would mean the Greek wars 
against Sparta etc. were the worst wars in the history of 
mankind up to then. In fact, in IR, Thucydides is usually 
taken as the starting point and little if any discussion occurs 
or knowledge is collected about wars preceding these wars. 
Hammond collected political writings on ‘world state 
ideas’ and political inventions from precisely this era and 
writes about the thought of Plato and his contemporaries. The 
sole references for the purposes here to be gathered from 
these writings could be an analysis of evolution of society 
from primitive times towards ‘civilised’ societies and the 
description of the first forms of institutions or alliances: “In 
primitive times, the most elementary form of society, the 
family, lived simply off natural products. As families grew 
and the different branches continued to cohere, the need for 
mutual support and protection necessitated more 
organization.” [9] and: “They had a Hellenistic League and 
several other leagues, in which citizens (men, not women or 
slaves) from different cities enjoyed citizenship”.  
4.2. Renaissance 
The Renaissance period, starting in Italy in the 14
th
 century 
and spreading throughout Europe until the start of the 
modern period, around 1750, brought forth major war – the 
30 Years War, 1618 to 1648 – as well as a substantial body of 
writings about war and politics and peace. For example, 
some of the best known writers from this period count 
amongst the classics in IR literature: Abbe St. Pierre, 
Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant (Macchiavelli was the only of the 
classics living and writing shortly before the outbreak of the 
30 Years War). One can argue that their ideas have been 
developed in response to major war, in particular the 30 
Years War. All of these thinkers dealt with either the problem 
of war and/or its solutions. The ideas for solutions differ, 
from arguments for the creation of sovereignty (Hobbes), to 
arguments about global integration for peace (Kant, St. 
Pierre), to liberal ideas about freedom (Rousseau).  
Hobbes, as the historically first contributor, described how 
a functioning state would need to be structured to prevent or 
solve the problem of civil war. His ideas arguably contributed 
to the establishment of the principle of sovereignty laid down 
and realised with the Treaty of Westphalia. [10] 
Kant, later than Hobbes, and a follower of St. Pierre 
argued for a confederation of republics. [11] While this idea 
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at the time seems not have to been taken up, it later became 
extremely influential for the creation of the United Nations 
and the ideology to spread democracy around the globe. It 
also influenced research on the Democratic Peace Theory, 
which by some is believed to be the most successful research 
programme in the field of International Relations. Previous to 
this, the ideas of Kant might have served to inspire the 
creation of coalitions of republics, such as the Concert of 
Europe, or the League of Nations.  
Rousseau is generally believed to have influenced 
Liberalism more. [12]  
4.3. Modern Period 
The modern period was marked by two major wars, the 
First and Second World War. These two major wars inspired 
new solutions to the problem of war, similar to the 30 Years 
War previously. While the First World War was responded to 
with the creation of the League of Nations, the latter was not 
sufficiently strong and developed enough to prevent the 
Second World War. After WWII, the League was abolished 
and replaced with an even stronger organisation along similar 
ideas, the United Nations and the UN’s sub-organisations. 
Also, additional institutions were established, such as the 
European Union, NATO, as well following this many others. 
This period was also marked by a strong international 
movement supporting the creation of a world state. 
The period directly following the Second World War for 
many decades was marked by the Cold War, in which two 
opposing superpowers and their alliances found themselves 
in a standoff, including arms races, intellectual and 
technological races and ideological wars for supremacy. In 
this period, on the Western side international institutions 
were further developed and spread. On the Soviet side, also 
ideas for how to establish global or international peace were 
developed.  
When the Cold War ended, the term ‘global governance’ 
became fashionable. It referred to the collection of attempts 
to govern on a global level, from top to bottom, including the 
UN system, other forms of cooperation between countries, 
and activities at and from the local level.  
More recently, the global governance debate is not as 
prominent anymore, but still of substantial value. The era of 
the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ (roughly 2001 to 2008 or 
2015) brought forth new literatures about war (in particular 
about how to counter terrorism) but also inspired new efforts 
to think about international or global peace. The world state 
discussion was revived, based on the named classical 
literatures, and some prominent new writings. 
Ideas for reform of the current global governance system 
were also presented in this period. 
5. Causes of War 
Oftentimes wars center around three main causal factors: 
fear (also theorized as uncertainty or insecurity, the Security 
Dilemma etc.), honour (also theorized as prestige, status, 
recognition etc.) and interests (usually understood in a quite 
material sense, as capabilities, military, economic or other 
elements of power, such as GDP, population strength, 
economic dominance, technological development, military 
strength, which is dependent on economic dominance etc.). 
In systemic theory, as well as in world systems theory, the 
causes of war are usually described in terms of power 
struggles, transitions, balances and so forth. Polarity – the 
distribution of material capabilities, such as economic 
strength, military might, population base, technological 
advancement, and political stability (the latter not strictly a 
material factor) – is usually taken to describe the 
constellation of the system and from there on estimate the 
various risks of war. Different constellations of polarity – 
unipolarity, multipolarity, bipolarity, or one, two or many 
great powers – are thought to bring forth different risks of 
war [13, 14, 15]. Unipolarity is thought to lead to many 
frequent small wars, but no major wars. Multipolarity is 
thought to have the risk of not too frequent but major wars. 
Bipolarity is generally thought to be most stable, but if it is 
thought as cluster bipolarity (meaning a constellation in 
which two opposing alliances dominate) it is thought to 
possibly bring forth world wars [16]. In general, however, 
these constellations all are centered around counting material 
strength, counting any material factors that can either be 
utilized for war or are necessary for survival. These factors 
all exclude soft factors, such as ideology, culture, knowledge, 
religion, law, norms etc. World systems theory likewise looks 
mainly at material factors, but focuses more on a critique of 
domination in the international system, i.e. hegemony, what it 
is based on, i.e. capitalism, and when it changes hands, i.e. 
hegemonic transition. Overall, however, all presented 
approaches to explain the causes of war on a global systemic 
level take material factors very seriously. Exceptions do 
exist, such as for example Samuel Huntington’s Clash of 
Civilisations [17] theory, in which religion and culture as a 
cause for conflicts are promoted. But generally speaking it 
seems that material factors are thought more important for 
war than immaterial factors. If this is always true or not 
needs to be decided somewhere else. However, the argument 
here is that hence – taken the knowledge about causes of war 
together – unequal distributions of material capabilities 
usually bring forth conflicts. This is not a necessary result, 
some inequalities remain stable, but it is a normal and 
common cause. 
To give some examples: Terrorism, even if one follows 
Huntington, can be causally related to a large degree to 
material inequalities [18]. This has by now confirmed in a 
number of studies and is even hinted at in Huntington. 
Classical literatures on terrorism conceptualise this with 
concepts such as ‘life chances’, imperialism and ‘structural 
violence’, for example, which to a large degree mean that 
material power differentials exist which are causally related 
to aggression and violence [19]. Similarly, for both World 
Wars, power differentials can be brought in to propose 
some major causes, such as the ‘backwardness’ of the 
Balkan countries before the First World War, as well as 
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maybe the lack of colonies for some European countries, 
and the Great Depression with resulting mass 
unemployment for the Second World War. The Cold War is 
here an interesting case a bit out of the order. Apparently, 
this conflict was marked by higher levels of equality 
between the two contenders. Equality was not strict, 
complete or consistently present, but it was higher than 
before the Two World Wars or in many other cases of 
conflict. Potentially, here is a reason for the assumed 
stability of this system to be found. When equality 
collapsed due to overspending of the Soviet Union and 
economic decline, the conflict ended. Of course, in all wars 
also ideological factors play a prominent role. This 
occurred in both World Wars as well as in the Cold War. 
However, the main theories of causes of war focus on 
material factors as causal explanations and dismiss ideology 
as a possible sole cause (or at least do not theorise it in this 
way).  
For Realism, this assumption goes back to the early 
writings about war, from Thucydides to others, where 
struggles for power, balances of power, etc. were thought 
about. Power, and the struggle for power as a cause for 
conflict, have since then become the main idea that the broad 
school of Realist thought bases their explanations for war 
and/or politics in general on.  
Hence, if it is assumed that material factors are causal for 
war and conflict, it is clear how the previously mentioned 
occurrences – sudden massive population growth in certain 
historical phases – could lead to war. Population growth, due 
to new inventions of technologies and an easier life at least 
for some at least for some time, might result in relative 
overpopulation when the first boom has receded, which will 
bring forth distributive pressures, hence relative inequality 
and poverty for many. These, on the other hand, are known 
causes of civil wars, terrorism, and revolutions, which can as 
well easily lead to major war (the First World War was 
sparked by terrorism, the Second by, one could say, a revolt). 
Even if this does not occur, struggles about distribution of the 
spoils of the ‘new economy’ might likely occur and can 
result in conflict and possibly major war if these pressures 
are growing too massively and cannot be managed. At the 
same time, sudden massive population growth might put 
existing political systems under pressure. Elites and 
institutions might not be able to cope with their distributive 
functions if populations suddenly increase by 100% or other 
similar dramatic numbers. Existing political structures might 
fail, something IR scientists call today ‘failed states’ when it 
happens in developing countries, and that is known to be 
causally related to civil wars.  
6. Population Growth Causes and Effects 
Population growth might result out of technological 
inventions which increase economic output and hence 
improve living conditions.  
While, as discussed above, sudden massive population 
growth, if unchecked and unmanaged, might produce 
governance failures and wars. As one of the few who link 
population growth to conflict, Penrose writes about 
Japanese territorial expansion into China to make the 
point and continues: “Some population writers have 
predicted a situation in which a slow, steady deterioration 
of economic conditions in certain areas over a long period 
of time, due to overpopulation, will lead to desperate 
attempts at external expansion by war. … Population 
factors therefore appear in some areas to have accentuated 
the social and political consequences of the business 
cycle.” [20] Conflict might follow due to the established 
problem of potential unemployment crises following 
massive population growth [21], hence inequality and 
poverty for some or many after a period of growth. 
However, the population growth possibly causal for the 
three periods of major war in history seems in a degree 
that is at each point in time unprecendented in then 
previous history (see appendix, relevant data marked).  
On the other hand, population growth can also be needed 
to fuel a strong economy. For example, in sparsely 
populated countries or regions, one could think of rural 
areas in Russia or Africa for example, economic capacity is 
naturally not as strong as in densely population areas or 
regions, such as city states, Japan, London, New York, etc. 
Hence, population growth might be needed for economic 
growth and might at times be promoted by the political 
establishments. However, if unchecked, this might result in 
the above problems.  
To give an illustration of results of massive, sustained 
population growth, the example of China shall be cited here: 
“One the one hand, rising population and population density 
initially led to intensified production, heightened 
commercialization, and greater urbanization in the eighteenth 
century. On the other hand, sustained population growth 
eventually culminated in the inevitable decline of per capita 
production and subsequent emiseration in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. The process was Boserupian on the 
upswing, Malthusian on the downswing” [22].  
Population growth in itself is often caused by 
technological, scientific and hence economic progress, but 
the latter leads later to fertility decline:  
“First, the permissive basis for the great rise in per capita 
product, combined with high rates of population growth, was 
the rapid increase in our tested knowledge of natural 
processes, applied to problems of production technology 
[meaning industrialization]. … [this means] pressure towards 
higher production levels. … It also has bearing on fertility.” 
[23] 
Generally, the relationship between population growth and 
development economics is not clearly defined, various 
theories propose different mechanisms connecting these two. 
[24] However, if population growth is met with lacking 
investment and economic growth, a natural outcome is 
underemployment and poverty, and this leads to the known 
causes of conflict.  
For example, significant population growth has been 
promoted in Muslim countries in particular in the 1990ies. 
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This is mentioned in Huntington’s thesis and explained as 
culturally dependent. Some analysts relate the resulting 
‘youth bulge’ with accompanying massive youth 
unemployment to the Arab Spring and possibly the rise of 
Islamist terrorism. In addition, in the current phase, it seems 
that propaganda moves to increase population growth in 
some Eastern European countries and Russia, but also in 
some Islamic countries, such as Turkey, are taken. Again, this 
can result in the wanted effects of economic growth if the 
economic conditions are favourable and it is well managed. If 
economic downturns occur and if the growth exceeds the 
manageable limit, there is an intense risk of conflict. In the 
current period of global development, it would make sense to 
use the United Nations to monitor population growth and 
develop recommendations as well as support mechanisms – 
in particular economic support mechanisms, such as for 
example, but not only, a Global Welfare State or a Global 
Marshall Plan, in addition to already known economic 
processes, such as globalization etc., or mechanisms that are 
currently in discussion, such as a General Basic Income. On 
the other hand, it also would be sensible to promote and 
ensure women’s rights to govern their reproductive capacities 
in a self-determined way, with the necessary rights and tools 
available.  
7. In Defense of Childlessness 
Out of the Generation X (the generation born between 
1965 and 1977 roughly), it was stated that about 40% of 
women (now in their 40ies) remained childless [25]. The 
reasons have not yet been established. Overall, in the total 
population of today, 1 out of 5 women remains childless. 
This should not be a cause for public outcry and 
moralisation, but rather a point of joy and a sign that society 
is advancing and women’s rights are improving.  
Historically, before the invention of contraception and 
other family planning methods, having children was the 
common fate for most women, apart from nuns and infertile 
women. This fate might have been often accepted as 
unavoidable, but in the literature there is historical evidence 
that at least some women suffered under it. For example, 
Florence Nightingale seems to have spent a life trying to 
avoid the fate of being married and having to have children. 
In fact, it is likely that the struggle against this fate caused 
immense creativity and was also influenced by it. Other 
examples are women who pretended to be men and joined 
foreign armies as doctors or started to study at universities, 
disguised as men. How many women would have liked to do 
so and to avoid pregnancy is unknown, but the success of 
family planning methods in reducing reproduction rates 
indicates that it is by far not every woman’s wish to become a 
mother. 
From a woman’s point of view, this decision or point of 
view makes sense. Children pose a responsibility (even 
though of course also a source of joy) that is virtually 
unmatched by any other possible responsibility, maybe apart 
from the one of having to care for elderly parents or suffering 
from a debilitating disease. Such responsibility does restrict 
the possibilities of enjoying all the other options that life in 
today’s society has to offer, a society in which women have 
far more chances than ever before, even if they are by far not 
yet really equal, even in the most advanced countries. 
Historically, the childbearing function of women was THE 
most important cause of gender differences in academic 
achievement, professional and political participation and so 
forth, and was at the root of all the restrictions and limitations 
that women experienced. In many more traditional societies 
this still applies.  
Alongside ‘the pill’, the inventions of the modern welfare 
state with affordable child-caring services brought some 
improvements for many women who now can afford to 
return to work, at least part time, after having cared at home 
for their children in the first years of life. But still statistics 
calculate that women work on average 14 hours per week 
more than men if one includes the housework and the care 
for children, and this must of course be considered a reason 
for women in general still not catching up to be equal with 
men in the public sphere.  
This article will first present some general arguments for 
voluntary childlessness from a woman’s point of view. 
It will then conclude with an argument that the rights of 
childless women should be protected against pressures to 
become a mother and against stigma of remaining childless.  
8. Arguments for Childlessness Today 
Overpopulation worldwide: The world is assumed to host 
7 billion people today. Some projections predict double this 
number - 14 billion! - by 2090 [26]. In many countries, 
growing population or overpopulation causes a serious 
strain on the economy, in particular when people get older. 
The youth bulge [27], on the other hand, in the Middle East, 
turns critical when it meets a weak economy and mass 
unemployment. These factors meeting together are thought 
by some to be at least partially responsible for phenomena 
such as the Arab Spring and Islamist terrorism. China, for 
example, has implemented a policy of restricted 
reproduction (‘One child policy’) to avoid the fate of India 
and to allow for stable growth and an increase of wealth in 
their already massive population. In the Western world, 
reproduction rates are by far not as high, and in some places 
a decrease in population is even expected. However, 
pressures of immigration, in particular by young individuals 
from developing countries, are a possibility to redress this 
decrease. It has long been warned by the United Nations 
and other organisations that in particular an unrestricted 
growth in the world population could have devastating 
consequences for humanity’s survival, as it would impact 
the economy, the environment, etc. More people mean more 
need for jobs, but also mean more cars, more water used, 
more farms needed, more mega-cities being built. It is by 
far not clear how many people the world will be able to 
hold without destroying the very basis for humanity’s own 
survival. Until humanity has not developed a significant 
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capacity to inhabit outer space and foreign planets, it 
therefore makes sense, even though it is not an imperative 
for everyone, from an informed cosmopolitan point of view 
to decide against children.  
Costs of having children: A second point is a traditional 
one that, however, seems to affect many women today and 
might affect many, or potentially even more, women in the 
future. The costs of education, housing and childcare are 
rising in many places. For many women this means that 
children are simply financially out of reach, in particular 
in their childbearing years when the earning capacity is for 
many not as strong as maybe later in their careers. It will 
be interesting to see what the generation of today’s 
students in the West, many of whom will leave university 
with a significant debt that at other times could have been 
used to purchase a house, will decide in terms of their own 
reproduction. It is very much possible (but this is 
speculation) that this generation will reproduce in even 
smaller numbers than the current generation of 40 year 
olds.  
Freedom is maintained without children (time for reading, 
time to work, less burnout and stress and mental illness, time 
and money to travel, etc. etc.): Freedom has become ever 
more available for women with increasing rights of access. 
Women therefore learn increasingly to cherish the freedoms 
that traditionally only a select few, and mostly men, enjoyed. 
Time that a mother has to spend on raising children can be 
used by childless women for any purpose imaginable, from 
investing in professional success, to exploring the arts, and so 
on and on. Liberating women from the childbearing role 
allows for the growth of creativity in a significant section of 
the population (childlessness is more a phenomenon in the 
Western and developed world still). Humanity can only 
imagine what products this freed creativity will bring over 
time!  
All big things have been achieved mainly by women 
without children (look at the Western female leaders, Merkel 
and May, both childless) or by men without children (many 
of the great thinkers either stayed unmarried and childless – 
Kant, Newton – or abandoned their children – Einstein, 
Rousseau). Also, the male saints and many of the female 
saints remained childless. In many religions it is even 
believed that women cannot achieve any form of 
enlightenment because they have to deal with raising their 
children. In many areas and professions, children might be 
the reason that women do not advance to the same level as 
men. Or other interests might be more important (work, 
spirituality, art, hobbies, friends etc.) than raising a family, 
and they might indeed be mutually exclusive. Therefore, 
someone might simply not want children [28, 29]. 
Specifically after a certain age. Why does society impose the 
need to bear children on women who don’t want [30] or need 
them when the world experiences over-population? This is 
very backward and fit only for orthodox countries. In a time 
when the state protects LGBT rights, society should equally 
have the right for women to remain childless.  
9. Rights of Childless Women 
Coercion or pressure to become a mother should be 
outlawed. Methods of planned parenthood should be further 
developed, and access should be facilitated. This is 
particularly important in the developing world, where at least 
for some women and in some countries, and apart from 
culture, also lack of means to plan parenthood are a cause for 
the high birth rates. This could also mean that for example 
female circumcision is a means to prevent more births, rather 
than a means to simple prevent sexual pleasure per se due to 
religious reasons. Furthermore, stigma should be fought the 
same way that stigma against the LGBT community is 
outlawed. A future world would include the human right for 
women to decide their own fate completely free of the 
traditional assumption that a woman has to become a mother. 
Other options for women’s life plans should be promoted to a 
higher degree, citing notable examples of female pioneers 
from all walks of life, in the arts, in science, in business and 
politics, for example. Women should be encouraged to 
explore these options and encouraged in their ambitions 
(something that is still not traditionally pursued as intensively 
with women as it is with men).  
10. Conclusion 
All three major periods of war in history known to Western 
IR – the Greek wars 500BC, the 30 Years War and following 
troubles 1600AD, and the Two World Wars 1900 AD – were 
preceded by sudden massive population growth and produced 
major political inventions towards their resolution and the 
ensurance of peace.  
With this assertion, this paper established a model of 
historical political evolution, different from existing models, 
but reliant one some of the important established data – IR 
scientists knowledge about major war and historical political 
works of importance – and some relatively unknown data to 
establish the causes spurring on these evolutionary changes - 
the known and available data on global population growth 
throughout history are extremely sparse and probably based 
on estimates, but this is literally all science can possibly 
know.  
Further research should investigate the reasons for such 
sudden unchecked population growth, how much population 
growth is reasonable and safe, as well as what history tells us 
about wars and their causes in other regions of the world 
where scientists know little. 
 
 





Figure 3. The above figure illustrates the sudden, massive population increase around the time of the Greek wars (first circle in yellow), the 30 Years War 
(second circle in yellow), and the Two World Wars (third circle in yellow). This illustration shows quite clearly that the population growth rate was usually 
highest directly before major war.  
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Figure 4. The above figure shows, similar to the previous table, that the growth rate of population is usually very high directly before major war, declines in 
war, and then rises again. Compare the table the European growth rate to the dates around 1600 – however here, the growth pattern for 1600 itself is 
unusually low, which could mean the numbers are from the war period itself (in blue) – for the 30 Years War and 1875; and 1875 and 1900 following for the 
First World War respectively (circles in yellow). 
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Figure 5. In this figure, one sees the significant population increase in Europe before the First World War (circles in yellow).  
 
Figure 6. This figure shows that the period between 0AD and 1100 was a period that did not show as massive population increase. It is also believed to have been 
a period of relative calm in European history. The period when wars, including major wars, occurred again – the 30 Years War around the early 17th century with 
the conclusion of the Treaty of Westphalia which established the principle of sovereignty in 1648 – is shown here as a period of rapid population increase above 
the levels ever experienced before to that date.  
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Figure 7. Chinese census or registration statistics, selected dates, AD 2 – 1953. The Ch’ing dynasty, in which there was massive population increase, was also 
a period of major war in Chinese history.  
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Figure 8. China: Population estimates since the fourteenth century AD. This figure shows periods of rapid population increase in Chinese history. These 
periods correspond to periods of major war in Chinese history, mainly since the Ch’ing dynasty since 1700.  
 
Figure 9. This figure can be correlated to the conflicts in South America that occurred in the 1960ies to 1980ies, after massive population increase around 
1900 and following (yellow circle).  
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